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Abstract
In modern democracies, the media are a key actor in the political process. They are the
main source of information from which citizens draw their knowledge about political mat-
ters. From the perspective of the rationality of public opinion building the principle of di-
versity is regarded as the central norm to evaluate the performance of the media. This pa-
per focuses on the structural aspects of media diversity. The assumption is that the institu-
tional structure eventually affects the quality of information communicated to citizens. The
objective of our study is to establish a macro-analytical framework of the diversity princi-
ple. We elaborate indicators and typologies for empirical evaluation, which are then taken
to classify the media systems of advanced Western democracies (OECD countries). The
empirical analysis captures the period between 1970 and 1990 (press) and 1980 and 1990
(broadcasting) when the media were undergoing rapid economic and technological changes
with considerable consequences for the structure of diversity.
Zusammenfassung
Im modernen demokratischen Prozess kommt den Massenmedien zunehmend eine Schlüs-
selrolle zu, da sie die wichtigste Informationsquelle sind, aus der die Bürger ihr Wissen
über Politik beziehen. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt rationaler Meinungsbildung kann Vielfalt
als die zentrale Norm zur Beurteilung der Leistungen der Medien angesehen werden. Im
vorliegenden Papier werden die strukturellen Aspekte von Medienvielfalt untersucht, da
angenommen wird, dass die institutionellen Arrangements letztendlich die Qualität der
Information beeinflussen. Ziel der Studie ist es, einen makro-analytischen Ansatz des Viel-
faltprinzips zu entwickeln. Wir stellen empirische Indikatoren und Typologien vor, auf
deren Basis die Mediensysteme entwickelter westlicher Demokratien (OECD-Länder)
klassifiziert werden können. Die empirische Analyse umfasst den Zeitraum zwischen 1970
und 1990 (Presse) bzw. 1980 und 1990 (Rundfunk). In dieser Periode waren die Medien
tiefgreifendem ökonomischen und technologischen Wandel unterworfen mit weitreichen-
den Folgen für die strukturelle Vielfalt von Mediensystemen.
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Structures of diversity of press and broadcasting systems:
The institutional context of public communication in Western
democracies*
1 Introduction
In modern democracies, the mass media have become a key actor in the political process.
For most citizens the media are the main -  if not the only -  source of information from
which they learn about political matters. Individual political opinion-building and voting
decision are largely based on information the media provide about the course of the gov-
ernment and the proposals made by political parties (Neuman 1986). Political actors also
rely on the mass media to reach their goals. The media enable them to monitor the social
environment and to communicate with the citizenry. Specifically during electoral cam-
paigns, political parties become more and more dependent on the mass media for mobiliz-
ing public support (Noelle-Neumann 1982; Kennamer 1992). Given the central role the
media play in the democratic process, their structure and performance have vital implica-
tions for the viability of democracy.
In this paper we will focus on the structural conditions under which the mass media pro-
duce and distribute political information. Institutional arrangements are a major precondi-
tion of the media's democratic performance as they may promote or constrain their ability
to provide complete and reliable information. Our analysis starts with a theoretical discus-
sion arguing that from the viewpoint of democratic norms diversity is to be regarded as the
central structural feature of media systems. In a next step, macro-analytical indicators of
diversity in press and broadcasting are developed to describe the empirical variations be-
tween media systems in Western democracies. Finally, different dimensions of structural
diversity will be used to construct typologies by which media systems can be classified.
The macro-analytical comparative approach, as it is pursued in this paper, is still a rather
underdeveloped field in media research. More than twenty years ago, Blumler/Gurevitch
(1975) initiated the discussion on the benefits of the comparative approach for studying
political communication. They pointed to the necessity of concepts of system characteris-
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2tics to be developed as a basic tool of comparative media research. More than ten years
later, Gurevitch/Blumler (1990) revised the field. While the interest in comparative re-
search has increased considerably among students of mass communication, there is still a
lack of a common core of theoretical concepts and empirical indicators specifying the cen-
tral structural dimensions of the mass media. This deficit is reflected in a volume compil-
ing various comparative studies in media research (Blumler/McLeod/Rosengren 1992).
Although presenting highly interesting analyses, most of the articles do not systematically
employ comparative concepts and make only intuitive assumptions that the macro-
structural context explain the empirical results.
However, taking account of the institutional arrangements of public communication is a
promising strategy to deepen the understanding of the conditions and consequences of
mass communication as it allows for a more valid testing of hypotheses (McLeod/Blumler
1987; Mayer 1989; Dogan/Pelassy 1990; Calvert 1993). For example, behavioral research
on media effects often reveals contradictory results that can hardly be generalized in a
meaningful way (McGuire 1986). Comparative analyses that control for context variables
would provide the opportunity to specify under which particular structural settings certain
patterns of media performance and media effects take place (Schmitt-Beck 1998).
This paper aims at contributing to the development of theoretical concepts of media
structures and their empirical measurement in comparative political communication re-
search. In addition, the general conceptualization of the mass media as an actor of the in-
termediary system that links citizens with the political system, may promote the integration
of media studies and comparative politics.
Theoretical considerations
2 Mass media and democracy: Diversity of information and democratic
choice
The media are multifunctional serving not only political, but also economic and cultural
needs. Therefore, the theoretical framework of the analysis is of crucial importance to the
definition of the structural characteristics by which media systems are to be described and
classified. Each of the various societal processes the media are involved in may imply dif-
ferent definitions of concepts and indicators. In this analysis, basic assumptions about the
media's role in the democratic process serve as a theoretical point of reference. Economic
structures and technological developments of the media, which are the focus of a number
of other macroanalytical studies (Rogers/Balle 1985; Dyson 1986), will only be considered
so far as they affect the democratic role of the media.
3In the following, we will briefly discuss functionalist and normative theories of democ-
racy to understand the specific role of the media in the democratic process and to identify
the structural arrangements that are relevant to the democratic performance of the media.
In their structural-functional approach, Almond and Powell (1966) discuss the political
communication function along with interest articulation and interest aggregation as con-
stituting the intermediary system of politics. Although each of these functions is performed
by communication, the authors argue that in the course of societal differentiation and mod-
ernization political communication has emerged as a specialized function which is mainly
performed by the mass media. According to Almond (1960:47), mass communication al-
lows "a free flow of information from the society to the polity and, in the polity, from po-
litical structure to political structure. It also makes possible an open feedback from output
to input again." Other authors refer to this encompassing communication function as the
general linkage function of the media (Gurevitch/Blumler 1977; Alger 1989).
The media's political communication function is based on specific capabilities and per-
formance qualities. First, the mass media have developed techniques and professional pro-
cedures which enable them to collect and process large amounts of information and dis-
tribute it to all participants of the political process. Second, media communication is ex-
pected to represent the whole range of political standpoints and to give access to all politi-
cal actors who aim at addressing the public. Therefore, Almond (1960) describes media
communication as "generalistic" in contrast to the "particularistic" mode of communication
of political parties or interest groups. Usually, this characteristic is referred to as media
diversity. Since generalistic, or diverse, information comprises all relevant opinions, it can
be transmitted across the boundaries of particular interests arising from antagonistic eco-
nomic or cultural conditions. Media systems that are characterized by a high degree of di-
versity are considered to be a public forum where the exchange of arguments and collec-
tive deliberation takes place.
Another confirmation of media diversity being a central structural characteristic of the
democratic process can be drawn from Dahl's normative theory of democracy. In his gen-
eral conceptualization, Dahl (1979; 1989) distinguishes between the "criteria of procedural
democracy" and democratic "institutions." Democratic criteria are the indispensable stan-
dards without which a political system could not be regarded as democratic. Democratic
institutions are the preconditions that are necessary to satisfy the normative criteria. Dahl
(1989:222) defines five fundamental criteria of democracy: voting equality, effective par-
ticipation, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion; and seven in-
stitutional preconditions: elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, right
to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information, associational autonomy.
"Alternative information" points to a media system that comprises diverse sources or sup-
4pliers of information. In addition, the institution of alternative information implies that
"citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information" and that "alternative
sources of information exist and are protected by law" (Dahl 1989:221). While all demo-
cratic systems provide sufficient legal protection of the democratic communication proc-
ess, usually by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and freedom of the press
(Breunig 1994), diversity, i.e., the plurality of the sources of information, is still regarded
as a vulnerable value that needs to be supported by particular formal arrangements (Blum-
ler 1992).
The crucial importance of alternative information is underlined by the fact that Dahl
classifies this "institution" as a precondition for the realization of all criteria of procedural
democracy, except voting equality. In other words, a wide range of democratic standards
cannot be achieved without a pluralistic mass media. According to the notion of the citizen
as the ultimate sovereign of democratic decision-making, alternative information is par-
ticularly necessary to satisfy the criterion of "enlightened understanding" since it provides
the citizens with "opportunities for discovering and validating ... what his or her prefer-
ences are on the matter to be decided" (Dahl 1979:105). The "enlightening" effect of diver-
sity is usually derived from its competitive nature. The assumption is that none of the dif-
ferent viewpoints in the political contest can claim final prevalence and, therefore, any
viewpoint has an equal and legitimate right to public debate. Classical liberal theory of
freedom of speech draws on the metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas." In this approach
the competition of opinions is regarded as a procedure to discover the best solution to a
specific problem in a specific situation (Kelley/Donway 1990; Braun 1990; Hayek 1969).
The confrontation of opposing viewpoints enables citizens to compare the relevant pros
and cons and make choices according to their own interests. As diversity gives all relating
viewpoints access to public consideration, it is also assumed to promote tolerance and to
restrain parochial decisions (O'Neill 1990).
In our discussion of the concepts and indicators of diversity we will take Dahl's empha-
sis on the citizen's capability to "enlightened" understanding as a reference point, although
the mass media are certainly an important source of information for political leaders as
well. While Dahl's theory refers to the individual citizen, Page/Shapiro (1992) argue that it
is the citizenry as a whole, or the public as a collective actor and its collective rationality
that counts in the democratic decision-making process. Both approaches have different
implications for the preferred structure of diversity.
It needs to be emphasized that these normative considerations should not be confounded
with the empirical appearance of mass communication. Undoubtedly, the empirical "mar-
ketplace of ideas" reveals considerable limitations in yielding complete information as
opinions do not have equal chances to become publicly articulated. In this paper normative
5assumptions serve as a theoretical justification for preferred structural features of media
systems that can be expected to make democratic opinion-building more likely. They also
provide a yardstick by which empirical variations of diversity can be evaluated (McQuail
1991a, 1991b; Rosengren 1991; Voltmer 1999).
3 An analytical framework for the study of diversity in media systems
An analysis of media diversity has to distinguish between structural and performance char-
acteristics (McQuail 1992). Structural diversity refers to the institutional arrangements in
which mass communication takes place. Performance diversity refers to the output, i.e., the
information the media are actually producing, which is usually measured by means of
content analysis. Our analysis focuses on the structural aspects of media diversity. The
relevance of structural diversity derives from the assumption that it is closely related to
performance diversity in that particular structural conditions of media systems guarantee
or, at least, foster the production of a diverse and generalistic information quality, whereas
other institutional settings impede the public representation of a broad plurality of political
viewpoints. Media systems that range high on the various dimensions of structural diver-
sity are assumed to provide citizens with a kind of information that meets the requirements
of "enlightened" participation better than systems with a low degree of structural diversity.
However, for the purposes of the present paper it is not possible to test empirically for the
relationship between structural and performance diversity.
In the following, we will suggest a typology of structure which serves as an analytical
framework to identify the main features of structural diversity in media systems.
3.1 Categories of structure
In general terms, structure is defined as the interrelations amongst the elements of a sys-
tem. The range of possible interactions between the elements of social systems is limited
both in terms of the exclusion of and the preference for certain actions which are defined
by rules (Sills 1968; Reimann et al. 1985).
Media systems are constituted by two types of structure, namely formal and informal
structures referring to different kinds of rules as their origin (Easton 1990; Fuchs 1993).
The formal structures of media systems are binding rules that are set by law. Since they are
imposed by various forms of authoritative regulations and incentives, they result in highly
stable and predictable patterns of interaction. Informal structures are based on procedures
and role expectations, the most important of which are organizational goals and profes-
sional norms concerning the selection and presentation of information. Informal structures
6are not prescriptive in nature and less stable in time than formal structures. In our typology
we follow Easton (1990) who defines empirically observable patterns of interaction as in-
formal structures, regardless of whether they are the consequence of existing rules or not.
Further, the diversity of media systems is constituted by two classes of elements, namely
actors and opinions. Actors refer to the media that participate in the political communica-
tion process, their respective strength and the variety of formats. Opinions refer to the po-
litical viewpoints represented and supported by the media.
Relating types and elements of the diversity structure of media systems result in a typol-
ogy as is shown in Figure 1. The categories of the dimensions will be discussed in the fol-
lowing sections.
Figure 1: Typology of diversity structure
Elements of structure Types of structure
Formal Informal
Actors • Legal regulation of institu-
tional setting (constitutional
guarantees, logic of opera-
tion, ownership control)
• Professional standards, eco-
nomic goals
• Empirical pattern of quanti-
tative diversity (competition
of actors/structures)
 
Opinions • Legal regulation of content
(obligation to balance)
• Editorial policy
• Empirical pattern of content
diversity (internal/external
diversity)
3.2 Types of diversity structure
3.2.1 Formal regulation of goal orientation
The formal structure of media systems is shaped by different bodies of legal regulation. On
a general level the constitution formulates basic rights and responsibilities of the partici-
pants in public communication. On another level, the central goal orientation of the media
is determined. In addition, specific problems of the media are regulated on subordinate
levels of law. The latter two areas of formal regulation are of particular importance for the
structure of diversity.
Civil law and administrative law are the most common legal frameworks by which the
general logic of operation of the media is determined. They are based on alternative princi-
ples of how diversity is to be achieved. The central instruments of regulation are the speci-
7fication of the dominant goal orientation, the allocation of resources, and the mode of su-
pervision implying the degree of possible political interference. Although some countries
have established formal structures that comprise a mixture of the instruments of both legal
frameworks, civil and administrative law will be discussed here as ideal types of formal
media structures.
Media operating within the framework of civil law are subjected to the logic of the mar-
ket. Since they usually draw their financial resources from economic profit, their central
goal orientation is governed by commercial interests. The liberal model of the "market-
place of ideas" is closely interrelated with competition on the economic marketplace, as-
suming that public welfare results from the actions of individuals each pursuing his or her
own interests. Civil law constitutes a strong protection of the media against state interven-
tion, leaving the enforcement of quality standards widely to self-regulation. Basically, me-
dia under civil law are conceptualized as instruments of their owners to give public voice
to their own viewpoints instead of serving common goals. However, it is disputed among
jurisprudents to what extent private media may exclusively pursue their own interests
without taking the public interest into account. For example, constitutional legislation in
Germany argues that media freedom is bound to the commitment to public interest (Bam-
berger 1986; Ricker 1983). In the USA, the Supreme Court has strengthened the public's
"right to know" against the individual interests of a newspaper (Lively 1991; Lowen-
stein/Merrill 1990)
Administrative law imposes the principle of social responsibility upon the media (Sie-
bert/Peterson/Schramm 1963; Lowenstein/Merrill 1990). In this formal arrangement the
media are obliged to serve the public interest rather than pursuing their own economic or
political goals. Further, information is seen as a public good that should be available to all
citizens regardless of their social or economic status. The social responsibility model has
been established as a counterweight to commercial media operating under civil law in or-
der to compensate for possible imbalances in the political communication process. To
safeguard the media from market competition they are typically financed by license fees.
Under administrative law the discretion of the media to follow a particular bias is restricted
to ensure that all citizens receive complete and diverse information. For this reason, the
media are supervised by the state or by governing bodies which control their functioning
according to their prescribed goals.
3.2.2 Informal rules: Professional standards and editorial policy
Informal structures can be divided into rules that apply to the entire media system and
those that structure the actions of individual media organizations. Professional standards
8constitute the identity of the system and are generally accepted. They enable the media to
process large amounts of input and to produce a highly standardized output. Among the
professional rules news factors can be regarded as the most important ones. They structure
the selection of news according to indicators of relevance (Galtung/Ruge 1965; Schulz
1976). Further, Tuchman (1972) describes strategies of objectivity the media employ in
order to deal with contradictory truth claims. Since news production takes place under
conditions of extreme uncertainties and time restrictions, it is impossible for the media to
decide which interpretation of reality is correct and which is not. The procedures of objec-
tivity comprise the rule of pairing each statement with another, opposite one, thus protect-
ing the media from potential criticism.
Individual media often develop an editorial policy which establishes a stable and con-
sistent pattern of selecting and interpreting political information. These media restrain the
ubiquitous validity of professional rules in favor of particular political preferences.
McQuail (1992:189ff.) describes partisanship as a variant of news practice that claims its
specific legitimacy besides objective, or neutral media information. He argues that editorial
preferences of media contribute to diversity as they allow the citizens to choose between
substantially different sources of information.
Usually the editorial policy is oriented at particular political parties and their ideological
programs. Seymour-Ure (1974) calls this correspondence "press-party parallelism" which
may be based on either a close loyalty or a more general ideological correspondence of a
newspaper with a political party. An example for close parallelism is the party press that
functions as a mere mouthpiece of a party. Party organs have almost disappeared as the
audience regards them of low credibility and does no longer accept the narrow range of
information. In contrast, media that are committed to a general ideology rather than a par-
ticular party preserve their financial and editorial autonomy and may frequently even op-
pose actual positions of ideologically close parties. Especially media that reconcile com-
plete and diverse news reporting with clear editorial preferences provide citizens with
meaningful information that reduces the contingencies of political opinion-building. Ideo-
logical parallelism may even be an economically reasonable strategy as in a competitive
market situation a distinguishable product may bind audiences with similar preferences
(Noam 1991).
3.2.3 Empirical interaction patterns
The empirical interaction pattern of the elements of media systems is partly the result of
the rules that are stipulated by formal legislation or the self-regulation of the media; partly
it emerges from the economic or political goals of the individual media actors. Since the
9interaction pattern refers to the distribution of and the dynamic between the media actors of
a given system and the opinions that are communicated it will be described in more detail
in the discussion of the elements of structure.
3.3 Elements of diversity structure
3.3.1 Diversity of actors: The quantitative dimension
Since diversity is basically a quantitative feature from which the possibility of choice
emerges, the number of actors is central to the evaluation of media diversity. The minimal
condition of diversity is the existence of at least two alternatives from which citizens can
choose. Thus, diversity is assumed to be the higher, the more sources of information are
available in a media system. However, quantity is not an end in itself. Rather, the dynamics
of competition evolves from the interaction between different actors and its consequences
for public opinion-building accounts for the perception of a large number as being a struc-
tural quality. Competition is assumed to increase the quality of the performance of the me-
dia as each aims at gaining as much audience support as possible by producing a kind of
output that is more attractive than that of the competitors.
Although the amount of actors is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient feature of
media diversity. A high number of "the same" would not allow meaningful choices on the
part of the citizens. The emphasis is therefore on significant differences between the me-
dia, or, as Dahl (1989) puts it, on "alternative sources of information" (italics: K.V.). Sev-
eral forms of variety that make a difference are discussed in the literature, amongst which
ownership is usually regarded as the most crucial one (Picard et al. 1988; Lacy/Simon
1993; Rager/Weber 1992). Like many other economic branches, the media industry is
characterized by growing concentration. With more and more media outlets being under
the control of a few financially powerful companies the mechanisms of competition in
public discourse are at risk to be jeopardized. It is feared that as a result of concentration
the quality of information and the range of opinions will be restricted. In addition, the in-
creasing internationalization of media companies is a severe impediment to transparency
and political control of ownership structure. Therefore, a main goal of formal regulation is
to preserve the viability of the "marketplace of ideas" by enhancing, or at least maintain-
ing, the number of independent media.
Another important aspect of diversity is constituted by alternative forms of financing and
control. Depending on whether the media are assigned to civil or administrative law, they
develop different goal orientations that would shape the quality of their output. Again, the
degree of diversity is assessed by the quantity of alternatives. A system that comprises both
10
forms of formal arrangement provides more possibilities of choice than a monostructural
system. Diversity is even higher when each of the structural alternatives consists of more
than one actor.
3.3.2 Diversity of opinions: The content dimension
The diversity of opinions refers to the content, specifically the different viewpoints in po-
litical conflicts which are conveyed to the citizens. In the context of democratic opinion-
building the diversity of opinions is the ultimate dimension of the diversity concept. As a
structural feature content diversity refers to the media's general policy of information proc-
essing, rather than the actual reporting (McQuail 1992:170ff.). It is a stable long-term pro-
gram that guides the selection of news and the choice of preferences in political conflicts
(Epstein 1974; Shoemaker/Reese 1991). Diversity of opinions in a given media system is
then the result of the editorial policies of the sum of the individual media which constitute
the system.
The degree of content diversity can be described empirically by the distribution of
opinions in a media systems. The range and the variety of opinions indicate the plurality of
political alternatives represented in the system. The balance of opinions points to the
chances of opposing viewpoints about getting access to the audience. Balanced media sys-
tems yield equal coverage of competing alternatives, thus allowing citizens to consider
both sides in political conflicts.
Diversity of opinions can be achieved by different structural principles. In the literature
it is distinguished between external and internal diversity as the basic patterns of content
diversity (McQuail/van Cuilenburg 1983; McQuail 1986; Hoffmann-Riem 1990). Each of
these patterns provides specific opportunity structures for "enlightened" decision-making.
In the following the two principles of content diversity will be discussed as ideal typical
concepts which would not be expected to be found as pure empirical patterns.
External diversity is constituted by a plurality of media actors each of them representing
a particular part of the entire spectrum of political opinions. Although the model of exter-
nal diversity permits individual media to be systematically imbalanced, it is assumed that
diversity emerges from the interaction of these actors on the aggregate level of the entire
media system. In their editorials, externally diverse media reveal clear preferences in favor
of one side of the political conflict. Frequently, the selection of news is also structured by
these preferences. Consequently, externally diverse media aim at particular segments of the
citizenry that support similar positions. The pattern of external diversity is most likely to
be found under the formal conditions of civil law since it allows the media owners to pur-
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sue particularistic goals which may imply the support of certain political parties or ideolo-
gies.
For the individual citizen the availability of alternative political viewpoints is limited as
long as he or she does not acquire information from several different sources. Conse-
quently, information serve mainly the confirmation of existing beliefs rather than a consid-
eration of different alternatives. Under the conditions of external diversity the requirements
of rational opinion formation are primarily met on the level of citizenry as a collective ac-
tor rather than that of the individual citizen.
Internal diversity is realized by any individual medium of a system each covering the
whole spectrum of the existing political viewpoints. Internally diverse media exercise a
balanced mode of news selection. In their editorials, they either support various standpoints
or are generally reluctant to express own preferences. Historically, internal diversity is a
relatively recent pattern of news media. Specifically in Europe, most print media had close
ties with political parties until the first decades of the 20th century. However, economic
constraints and the broad acceptance of professional standards like objectivity and news
values have strengthened the trend towards internal diversity (Schudson 1978). In contrast
to newspapers, the latitude of broadcast media to support particular political positions is
often limited by political regulation. In addition, economic constraints drive television to-
wards a policy of attracting large audiences usually resulting in internal diversity.
Internal diversity is a structural condition that makes alternative political viewpoints ac-
cessible on the level of the individual citizen. As it confronts the recipient with opinions he
or she may not share, internal diversity supports processes of "enlightened understanding"
and the consideration of competing arguments. However, some authors point to possible
disadvantages of a kind of information that does not give any hint for preferable positions.
McQuail (1992:188) argues that equal coverage of contradictory viewpoints may contrib-
ute to political indifference and "the withdrawal from value commitments;" and Watten-
berg (1986) relates the growing volatility of the American electorate to the predominance
of neutrality in mass communication.
Empirical analysis
4 Design and operationalization
To analyze diversity empirically the heterogeneous institutional structure of media systems
has to be taken into account. First, it has to be differentiated between the levels on which
media diversity is measured and evaluated. Second, the units of analysis have to be speci-
fied.
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4.1 Levels of analysis
As McQuail/van Cuilenburg (1982) point out media diversity is to be conceptualized on
three levels, namely the macro-level, i.e., the entire media system, the meso-level, i.e., the
subsystems of press and broadcasting and its subordinate segments, and the micro-level,
i.e., individual media actors. Figure 2 gives an overview of the levels of the analysis.
Figure 2: Levels of analysis
System level: Media System
Subsystem level: Press Broadcasting
System System
Segment level: Public Commercial
Segment Segment
Actor level: Newspaper Stations Stations
The distinction between press and broadcasting refers to the very nature of the respective
medium types determining the specific mode of production, distribution and consumption.
Both subsystems operate under different formal frameworks which constrain the possible
structures of diversity. Due to the specific institutional conditions of press and broadcast-
ing, particular indicators of diversity for each of the subsystems are to be defined.
4.2 Units of analysis
The smallest unit of our empirical analysis is the actor, specifically the media organizations
as collective actors rather than individuals like owners or journalists. In order to describe
media diversity at the meso and macro levels, the actors are aggregated to subsystems or
the entire system. However, the operationalization of what can be regarded as actor is not
totally self-evident. Our specification relies on the following three conditions: First, only
the dominant type of media actors in each subsystem is considered in order to keep the
analysis feasible. Second, media actors are defined from the perspective of citizens and of
the discernible alternatives from which they can choose. Third, only those media actors
that produce and distribute within the national context are included into the analysis. The
reason is that, in spite of the increasing internationalization and globalization of mass
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communication, the structure of media systems is still primarily the result of the decisions
of national governments.
According to these conditions, the actors of press systems are specified as follows:
First, daily newspapers are considered to be the dominant type of actors. This type of
print media reaches nearly the entire citizenry and is central to the processes of political
learning and political opinion-building. Weeklies are not taken into account because of
their relatively low coverage, although they often serve as opinion leaders with consider-
able impact on their readers.
Second, from the perspective of the citizen titles are the discernible alternatives. We do
not consider publishing houses, because these entities are not the primary objects of choice
for the ordinary citizen. Moreover, newspaper titles can be regarded as actors because each
outlet has an autonomous staff and delivers a product of a specific style, profile, and audi-
ence orientation. One might argue that publishing houses, not titles, are the relevant actors
because they ultimately decide on the general editorial policy. However, research on the
effect of ownership change on political reporting and commentary did not find a clear rela-
tionship (McCombs 1988). While some publishers may use their papers to spread their
standpoints, most of them act according to an economic rather than a political logic. In
addition, the growing prevalence of professional standards that emphasize news values and
objectivity is an effective barrier against the ideosyncrasies of individual owners.1
Third, foreign newspapers are not considered as part of a particular press system because
they are produced outside the national context. With respect to the area of coverage within
a country our analysis includes regional as well as national newspapers. In principle, each
newspaper, although it may have a particular regional center, is available all over the
country and thus theoretically serves as alternative source of information for the citizens.
Using the same logic as has been applied to define the dominant type of actors in press
systems, we take television as the dominant type of actors in broadcasting systems. Televi-
sion reaches virtually the entire citizenry and plays an exceptional role in political opinion-
building. In contrast, radio is mostly confined to certain regions of the country and is there-
fore not included in our analysis.
Second, we define stations as the discernible alternatives from which citizens can
choose. Even if several stations belong to one broadcast organization, they produce alter-
native programs. Like newspaper titles, stations have an autonomous editorial staff and are
characterized by a specific profile in terms of style, programming, and sometimes political
orientation. For the most part, stations are identical with channels, which are technical
                                                       
1 However, the cases of Silvio Berlusconi and Rupert Murdoch demonstrate that under certain cir-
cumstances media owners may decide to directly intervene into public opinion affairs.
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means of transmission. However, channels and stations differ empirically when several
actors use the same frequency.
New transmission techniques like cable and satellite offer broader access for a number
of additional actors. At the timepoints of observation in most countries, however, programs
distributed by these new transmission technologies were still not available for the majority
of the population. Therefore, we will not include them systematically in our analysis.
Broadcasting differs from press with respect to the area of coverage and regional avail-
ability. In contrast to newspapers, regional broadcasting stations are not principally avail-
able all over the country. For this reason our analysis includes only television stations with
national coverage, i.e., those which can be received by at least three quarters of the popu-
lation.
Third, more than in press systems national borders become increasingly irrelevant to
broadcasting. However, since we compare the structure of national media systems we in-
clude only those stations that are produced and distributed within a national broadcasting
system.
4.3 Data base
There exist only a few longitudinal data collections that cover a wide range of media sys-
tems. Since the present study aims at encompassing advanced Western democracies that
are organized in the OECD, most of the data presented here have been generated for the
first time. The data sets of our empirical analysis are compiled from the following sources:
Data on quantitative aspects of diversity of press systems can be found in the Statistical
Yearbook, published by the UNESCO (annually), as well as in the publication "World
Press Trends," edited by the Fédération Internationale des Editeurs des Journaux (FIEJ,
annually). The latter also provides detailed information on press laws, especially on owner-
ship regulation.2
In addition, data on content characteristics of single newspapers have been generated.
These data were mainly drawn from Banks' "Political Handbook of the World" (annually).
This handbook provides concise information about the political orientation of the main
newspapers of each country. We regard this classification as a substitute for a content
analysis of the newspapers. The information drawn from Banks was extended and checked
by several other handbooks (Western Europe 1989; Ostergaard 1992; see section 5.3).
                                                       
2 Other comparative studies, so Kurian (1982), do not generate own data but take the statistical infor-
mation from the UNESCO Yearbook as well. Erdmann/Fritsch (1990) have undertaken a compara-
tive study which relies on own enquiries, mainly a survey of national editor associations. Although
these data may be of higher reliability, we use this study only as an additional data source because
the selection of countries is confined to twelve European countries and to one time point.
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The data set on content diversity is confined to the ten most important newspapers of
each country, operationalizing importance by circulation rates. This restriction seems to be
a reasonable procedure. Extending the analysis to more than ten newspapers does not yield
a considerable gain in the proportion of the total circulation covered. The ten largest news-
papers represent the entire press system quite well. On the average, they cover more than
half of the total size of the press systems (1990: 60%; 1970: 55%). The coverage varies
between 100% in systems with ten or less than ten newspapers (Iceland, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg), and 16% in the press system of the United States which comprises more than 1,600
newspapers. Countries for which information on political orientation is missing for more
than 20% of the coverage of the most important newspapers, are excluded from the analy-
sis of content diversity. The analysis of press systems covers two time points: 1970 and
1990.3
The data set of broadcasting systems is based on country studies compiled in various
handbooks (Browne 1989; Hans-Bredow-Institut, annually; Noam 1991; Rosen 1988).
Information on formal regulation and on quantitative diversity of stations given in these
studies was coded according to our indicators of diversity. UNESCO's Statistical Yearbook
and the handbook on "The Media Scene in Europe" (STERN 1991) that primarily serves as
an information service for the advertising industry, were used to supplement information
on quantitative aspects of diversity.
In order to capture change in broadcasting systems, we compare the situation in 1990
with that in 1980, which is shortly before many countries began to introduce dual broad-
casting systems, allowing the coexistence of public service and commercial television sta-
tions.
5 Structures of diversity in press systems
A comprehensive analysis of all aspects of diversity as have been presented in Figure 1
would go far beyond the limits of the present study. We confine the analysis of press sys-
tems to the formal regulation of actors, and the dimensions of quantitative and content di-
versity.
5.1 Formal regulation: Goal orientation and ownership
Without exception, press systems of Western democracies are subjected to civil law, al-
lowing print media a high degree of independence from any political interference. The
                                                       
3 It has to be mentioned that the political regimes of Greece, Portugal and Spain were not yet demo-
cratic in 1970, Turkey experienced a military dictatorship. While this may not have an impact on the
quantitative dimension of diversity, it probably has on content diversity.
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formal arrangement implies that print media have to survive under economic competition,
but are free to choose any editorial policy. Since in contrast to most public broadcasting
systems the press market is characterized by a large number of suppliers, external diversity
is tolerated assuming that one-sidedness or restricted coverage of individual papers would
be balanced on the aggregate level. Although there is a broad consensus about newspapers
being expected to serve a function in the public opinion-building process (Lichtenberg
1990), no regulations exist to enforce such expectations.
As far as formal regulations exist, they mainly refer to the ownership structure of print
media. The main objective is to promote competition and to prevent the concentration of
opinion power, thus maintaining the viability of a free "marketplace of ideas." The most
frequent policy instruments aim at influencing the subsequent ownership structures: com-
position, i.e., limitation of the shares of publishing companies; transparency, i.e., preven-
tion of silent partners; concentration, i.e., limitation of multiple ownership within the press
system; and cross-ownership, i.e., limitation of multiple ownership between press and
broadcasting. Table 1 shows the extent to which these instruments are applied in OECD
countries.
Cross-ownership is the most often regulated aspect in order to keep the two subsystems
of the media system apart. 16 out of 21 countries exert this kind of control. The next fre-
quent aspect of ownership control is transparency (11 countries), followed by concentra-
tion (9 countries) and composition (6 countries). Adding up the four instruments of owner-
ship, control indicates the intensity of regulation in each of the countries. The average level
of regulation is 2.0. It is highest in France, Greece, Italy and the U.K. where all four in-
struments are applied. Most countries control only one or two aspects of ownership.4 Por-
tugal is the only country that does not impose ownership regulation at all.
Besides regulation of ownership structure, newspapers are subjected only to minimal
content regulation referring mainly to libeling and the observation of moral norms. Spe-
cifically, there exists no regulation that obliges individual print media to act according to
internal diversity and to represent the whole spectrum of the political contest.
Since the formal structure of press systems is based on the concept of external diversity,
the following analysis investigates the extent to which the empirical structure meets the
underlying expectations. In particular, we will analyze the quantitative dimension of diver-
sity which is perceived as a precondition of the diversity of opinions; further, we will ex-
amine whether the particular editorial policies of individual newspapers are balanced on
the system level.
                                                       
4 Especially the Scandinavian countries try to control the structure of the press system more by sup-
port instruments (tax and tariff reductions, direct subsidies) rather than restrictive measures (see
FIEJ 1993).
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Table 1: Ownership regulation in press systems (1990; sorted by sum of regulations)a)
Country Composition Transparency Cross-
Ownership
Concentration å
POR - - - - 0
BEL - - + - 1
DEN - + - - 1
FIN - + - - 1
LUX - - + - 1
NET - - + - 1
NOR - - + - 1
SPA - - + - 1
SWE - - + - 1
A - + + - 2
GER - - + + 2
IRE - + - + 2
JAP + - + - 2
SWI - + - + 2
USA - - + + 2
AUS + + + - 3
CAN - + + + 3
FRA + + + + 4
GRE + + + + 4
ITA + + + + 4
UK + + + + 4
å 6 11 16 9
n.a.: ICE, NEW, TUR.
a) Dotted line: average intensity of regulations (2.0).
-: No regulation.
+: Regulation exists; counted only when exceeding normal economic regulation.
Source: FIEJ 1992.
5.2 Diversity of actors: Quantity of newspapers and concentration
As we have pointed out earlier (see section 3.3.1), competition on the "marketplace of
ideas" is a precondition of the citizens' opportunity of choice. All press systems, even those
of very small countries, meet the minimal requirement of choice, i.e., consist of at least two
alternative newspapers. However, while the minimal condition of diversity is unequivocal,
it is impossible to specify the optimal number of newspapers. Thus, the comparison of
countries provides us with a picture of the relative degree of quantitative diversity, rather
than categorizing of press systems as being diverse or non-diverse.
There exist various indicators to describe the diversity of press systems (Woldt 1992).
Table 2 presents four basic measures, namely the absolute and relative numbers of news-
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papers, the absolute and relative circulation (density): The absolute number of newspapers
is a simple indicator of the amount of alternatives from which citizens can choose -  at least
theoretically. In this respect, the press system of the USA with some more than 1,600 out-
lets offers by far the highest degree of diversity, whereas Luxembourg with five newspa-
pers forms the bottom of the distribution, followed by Iceland and Ireland. Obviously the
absolute amount of newspapers is not independent from the size of a country and its popu-
lation. Therefore, the relative number of newspapers per one million inhabitants is a more
adequate measure of diversity in press systems. This indicator rates Iceland as the press
system with the highest degree of relative diversity, whereas the USA is now located
somewhat below average. At the low end of the distribution Japan is the extreme case with
only one newspaper title for every one million people. Quantitative diversity is also far
below average in all Romance countries. In general, a high degree of diversity can usually
be found in smaller countries, specifically the Nordic countries, though there are several
small countries with low diversity as well, for example Ireland and Portugal. Presumably,
diversity of press systems is determined by various cultural factors as well as the distribu-
tion system and the number of subscribers, which cannot be followed up here in more de-
tail. Generous support by state subventions certainly contributes to press diversity in Scan-
dinavian countries as well.
Another indicator of diversity refers to the concentration of circulation. It is seen as the
prevailing structural problem of press systems because it limits competition on the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" and strengthens the potential of single actors to dominate public opinion
formation (Klaue/Knoche/Zerdick 1980; Picard et al. 1988; Rager/Weber 1992). In the
right-hand part of Table 2 the measure of absolute circulation indicates the size of a coun-
try's entire press market which is contested by the existing actors. Newspaper density,
measured by the average circulation per newspaper, is taken as an indicator for the degree
of concentration.5 Again, the extreme case is Japan with an average of 580,000 copies per
newspaper. Japan is the only country where the main newspapers publish two editions per
day, with the largest reaching a daily circulation of more than 14 million copies. The high
density of the UK's press system is mainly due to the predominance of large tabloids which
account for about half of the daily total circulation. On the other hand, the press systems of
Turkey and Portugal are characterized by a very low density. It can be assumed that a
strong regional press contributes to a high degree of diversity, whereas systems with strong
national, metropolitan-based newspapers reinforce concentration. However, specific
groups of countries which would reflect area-specific cultural conditions cannot be identi-
fied.
                                                       
5 This indicator is commonly used in press statistics although it does not take the specific distribution
of concentration, i.e., the strength of single actors into account.
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Table 2: Quantitative diversity in press systems (1990)
Country N of newspapers Circulation
Absolute Relativea) Absolute
(in 1,000)
Relativeb)
(density)
A 25 4,47 2,706 108,200
AUS 62 4,11 4,200 67,700
BEL 33 2,32 3,000 90,900
CAN* 107 4,12 5,993 56,000
DEN 47 8,97 1,810 38,500
FIN 66 13,33 2,780 42,100
FRA 79 1,34 11,792 149,300
GER* 315 5,21 20,677 65,600
GRE 117 11,69 n.a. n.a.
ICE 6 20,00 n.a. n.a.
IRE 7 2,26 591 84,400
ITA* 76 1,27 6,093 80,200
JAP 125 1,02 72,524 580,200
LUX 5 13,16 143 28,600
NET* 86 5,83 4,592 53,400
NEW 35 10,64 1,100 31,400
NOR 85 19,76 2,588 30,450
POR 24 2,59 390 16,250
SPA 102 2,61 3,200 31,400
SWE 107 12,68 4,499 42,100
SWI 94 15,05 3,063 32,600
TUR 399 8,12 4,000 10,000
UK 104 1,82 22,494 216,300
USA 1,611 6,86 62,328 38,700
Mean 155 7,50 10,935 86,110
a) Number of newspapers (titles) per 1 million inhabitants.
b) Average number of copies per newspapers (titles).
*) Figures from 1988 or 1989.
Source: UNESCO 1990; author's calculations.
In the last two decades most press systems have experienced a considerable growth in total
circulation. This trend can be explained by increasing cognitive involvement of citizens
which involves the consumption of political information becoming a stable routine in eve-
ryday activities. The average growth rate of the total circulation between 1970 and 1990 in
the OECD is 21.6% and varies between 0.3% (USA) and 74% (Norway). Exceptions from
this trend are the southern European countries (France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal), the
U.K. and Ireland. In these countries circulation decreased by an average of 18.5%, ranging
from 2.3% (France) to 47.5% (Portugal). Changes in circulation rates can be distributed in
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two different ways. On the one hand, gains and losses may result in increasing or decreas-
ing numbers of actors. In this case, the degree of competition would not be affected, yet
there would be a higher or lower range of choice. On the other hand, the additional or di-
minished demand can be distributed to the existing actors, thus leading to a change in con-
centration, while the pattern of choice remains constant. Figure 3 demonstrates the changes
between 1970 and 1990:
Figure 3: Change of quantitative diversity in press systems: Relative number of
newspapers and density
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Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook; author's calculations.
A development to the disadvantage of quantitative diversity clearly dominates the picture
as fewer actors count for growing circulation rates. There is virtually no country where
additional actors were able to enter the system. Instead, in most countries increasing con-
centration goes along with a decrease of choice. Only in six countries concentration has
diminished, although this trend was not accompanied with an increase of choice either.
Two important problems of press concentration cannot be explored in more detail in the
framework of our study, namely regional monopolies and chain ownership. The first prob-
lem is closely related to the opportunity structure of choice. Regional diversity is important
because information about the immediate environment is the basis of a good deal of citi-
zens' participation. In their study of the economic diversity of the press, Erdmann/Fritsch
(1990) examined the regional supply with newspapers in twelve Western European coun-
tries. Taking all countries together, there are only 37% of the regions which provide choice
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between at least two newspapers, 40% offer only one newspaper, and in 23% of the re-
gions there doesn't exist any paper at all. Whereas single-paper regions lack the opportu-
nity of choice, zero-paper areas mean that even the availability of information is restricted,
especially about local politics. Choice between alternative sources of information at re-
gional level is the prevalent structure only in Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Germany,
of which the two Nordic countries offer an extraordinary situation with more than 90% of
the regions providing at least two newspapers.
The second problem refers to takeovers of smaller newspapers by powerful media con-
cerns, thus jeopardizing the dynamics of competition although the existing titles may per-
sist. Sanchez-Tabernero (1993) investigated the market shares of the largest publishing
houses in Western European countries. It turns out that up to two-thirds of the press market
is controlled by only two companies.
5.3 Diversity of opinions: Ideological balance
Since there exist no content regulations restricting the editorial policy of newspapers, con-
tent diversity is left to emerge from the interactions of the individual actors of press sys-
tems. The more newspapers pursue the policy of internal diversity, the higher is the prob-
ability that the whole spectrum of relevant political opinions is represented in the system.
On the other hand, a large number of partisan newspapers does not necessarily guarantee
diversity on the system level as is expected by the concept of external diversity. The reason
is that most of these papers may support similar viewpoints resulting in an imbalanced di-
versity structure. In the following we analyze the extent to which press systems are char-
acterized by internal diversity. In addition, it will be examined whether the particular bi-
ases of externally diverse newspapers are balanced on the system level.6
Our analysis of content diversity is based on coding the editorial policy of the ten most
important newspapers of a country (see section 4.3). Coding was performed as follows:
Newspapers that Banks' "Political Handbook of the World" classifies as "neutral" or "inde-
pendent" were assigned to the category "internal diversity." "External diversity" was coded
when newspapers were reported as being committed to a particular ideology or political
party. In a second variable the direction of the political orientation was coded according to
a left-right scale, using the same categories which have been developed in the "Compara-
tive Manifesto Project" to classify political parties (see Volkens 1992). The scale consists
                                                       
6 This approach does not consider whether the distribution of preferences in press systems represents
the actual opinions in society. The extent to which the press system covers the existing opinions
could only be assessed on the basis of a comparison with external data, e.g., comparing the ideologi-
cal spectrum of the press system with the ideological spectrum of the party system, or with survey
data on political orientations of the citizens.
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of six points which refer either to the commitment to a particular party or to a general
ideological orientation:7
1 "far left" = Parties: Communists; general ideology: extremely leftist, communist
2 Parties: Socialists, Social Democrats, Labor Parties; general ideology: leftist, liberal
(USA)
3 Parties: Liberals; general ideology: liberal, moderate
4 Parties: religious parties, Christian Democrats; general ideology: center, religious
5 Parties: Conservatives; general ideology: conservative, rightist, monarchist
6 "far right" = Parties: Nationalists; general ideology: extremely rightist, nationalist
In order to check the reliability of Banks' classifications we compared them with similar
assessments in other handbooks, namely "Western Europe 1989" and Ostergaard (1992).
These additional sources allowed us to compare the classifications of 102 newspapers. In
74 cases (73%) the left-right placement was identical with Banks; in five cases (5%) it was
similar, i.e., the placement deviates only by one point on the six-point scale; in 23 cases
(23%) we found divergent classifications. Ten of these divergent cases were classified by
Banks as neutral whereas the other sources reported a political bias; in eleven cases the
reverse pattern was found; two cases were placed differently by Banks and the other
sources, i.e., deviated two or more points on the left-right scale. In sum, 78% of the titles
were classified into an identical or similar category, indicating a high reliability of Banks'
classifications.
Figure 4.1 locates the OECD press systems according to their position on each dimen-
sion of diversity. The dimension "internal diversity" indicates the proportion of circulation
provided by newspapers which each represent the whole range of political viewpoints. The
dimension "external diversity" indicates the degree of balance between biased newspapers.
The mean left-right distribution of the externally diverse papers is weighted by their re-
spective circulation size.8 The more the value approaches 3.5 as the mean of the scale, the
more the press system is balanced. Values higher than 3.5 indicate imbalance in favor of
right orientations, while values lower than 3.5 indicate a dominance of left orientations.
The dotted line in the figure indicates the expected normative optimum. The underlying
assumption is that overall diversity can be achieved either by a high proportion of newspa-
                                                       
7 We do not distinguish between party commitment and general ideological orientation which may
indicate different degrees of exclusiveness with regard to opposing viewpoints.
8 The measure is similar to the "center of gravity" in comparative research on party systems
(Gross/Sigelman 1984).
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pers reporting according to the principle of internal diversity, or by an equal weight of dif-
ferently biased newspapers. The higher the proportion of internal diversity the more toler-
able is the one-sidedness of single newspapers; but balance becomes crucial with raising
degree of external diversity.
Figure 4.1: Content diversity in press systems: Internala) and externalb) diversity (1990;
ten most important newspapers)
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a) Percentage of the circulation of neutral newspapers.
b) Weighted mean of political orientation (1 = far left, 6 = far right).
Source: Banks (1990), author's calculations.
The empirical findings show that most of the countries are located within the normative
optimum of diversity. Seven of the 17 countries considered are dominated by the structure
of internal diversity, whereas in ten countries external diversity accounts for more than half
of the circulation. Most of these press systems meet the expectations of complementary
biases, with Spain, Luxembourg and Denmark showing an almost perfect balance between
left and right ideological orientations. Sweden and Iceland are located on the left and right
borderline respectively. The press systems of four countries, Greece, Italy, the U.K. and
Ireland, reveal a considerable lack of content diversity. In all of these countries rightist
viewpoints are overrepresented. An extreme case is Ireland where only a relatively small
proportion of the newspapers is devoted to the principle of internal diversity and all of the
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externally diverse papers support extreme right or nationalist positions. Greece, too, is an
extreme case in that none of the ten most important newspapers pursues the policy of in-
ternal diversity.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the change that has taken place in the last two decades. In 1970,
far fewer press systems achieved diversity through internal diversity, and more systems
were extremely imbalanced.
Figure 4.2: Content diversity in press systems: Internala) and externalb) diversity (1970;
ten most important newspapers)
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a) Percentage of the circulation of neutral newspapers.
b) Weighted means of political orientation (1 = far left, 6 = far right).
Source: Banks (1970), author's calculations.
In order to obtain an overall measure of balance the distinction between internal and exter-
nal diversity is omitted in Table 3. Neutral newspapers were assigned to the mean of the
left-right scale. In 1990, nine of 17 countries achieve a very high or high degree of balance
with less than .10, or .20 respectively, points of deviance from the center of the left-right
scale. Most of the observed deviant cases favor right positions. The press systems of
Greece, Norway, Finland, Italy, Iceland, the U.K. and Ireland show considerable domi-
nance of rightist orientation, whereas Sweden is the only country whose press system
clearly supports leftist viewpoints. Comparing the scores of 1990 and 1970 confirms that
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balance in nearly all press systems has improved over time. Improvement is especially high
in countries with originally extreme imbalances, while due to a ceiling-effect countries
with high balance in 1970 have undergone less change. Minimal exceptions from this gen-
eral trend can be found in Germany, Italy and Norway, and a clear decline of diversity has
taken place in the United Kingdom. The deterioration in the United Kingdom can be put
down to the fact that most of the tabloids with growing circulation rates reported in favor
of conservative ideologies and, in addition, one of the largest tabloids has shifted from the
left towards the right.
Table 3: Overall balance in press systems (1970, 1990; circulation of most important
newspapers, sorted by deviance in 1990)
Country 1990 1970 1970/1990
Meana) Devianceb) Meana) Devianceb) Change of deviancec)
SWE 3.13 -0.37 2.88 -0.62 -0.25
A 3.39 -0.11 3.13 -0.37 -0.26
LUX 3.42 -0.08 3.31 -0.19 -0.11
SPA 3.46 -0.04 3.94 0.44 -0.40
NET 3.47 -0.03 3.65 0.15 -0.12
JAP 3.55 0.05 3.58 0.08 -0.03
BEL 3.58 0.08 3.14 -0.36 -0.28
GER 3.58 0.08 3.49 -0.01 +0.07
USA 3.62 0.12 3.70 0.20 -0.08
DEN 3.69 0.19 4.04 0.54 -0.35
GRE 3.75 0.25 5.31 1.81 -1.56
NOR 3.82 0.32 3.80 0.30 +0.02
FIN 3.82 0.32 4.00 0.50 -0.18
ITA 3.90 0.40 3.93 0.43 +0.03
ICE 3.99 0.49 4.45 0.95 -0.46
UK 4.18 0.68 3.98 0.48 +0.20
IRE 5.08 1.58 5.87 2.37 -0.79
n.a.: AUS, CAN, FRA, NEW, SWI, POR, TUR.
a) Weighted mean of left-right scale (1 = far left, 6 = far right; neutrality = 3.5).
b) Degree and direction of deviance from mean of left-right scale (minus = deviation towards left).
c) Decrease in deviance (= higher balance), +: increase in deviance (= lower balance).
Source: Banks, 1970, 1990; author's calculations.
26
5.4 Typology of press systems: Diversity of actors and opinions
What are the central dimensions to classify press systems of Western democracies? Due to
the low degree of formal regulations, we suggest a typology of press systems that draws on
informal structures, specifically the empirical pattern of quantitative and content diversity.
This classification may also shed some light on the relationship between concentration and
diversity of opinions which is disputed among media economists. The concern about
quantitative diversity originates from the presumption that as a consequence of growing
concentration and monopolization the range of opinions that enter the public agenda will
become more and more limited. However, previous empirical analyses show a rather am-
biguous relationship between the two dimensions of diversity (Entman 1985; Hale 1988;
Staab 1986). Some authors even argue that concentration contributes to content diversity
because large audiences force newspapers to cover a wide range of viewpoints. In addition,
the quality of information may be higher with large companies because their financial ca-
pacity allows them to invest in new technologies and a wide network of correspondents
(McCombs 1988). However, even though the spectrum of opinions may be covered suffi-
ciently, ownership concentration is regarded responsible for growing standardization of
media content at the expense of cultural pluralism (Humphreys 1996:66ff.).
Figure 5
 presents the classification of press systems according to the dimensions of
quantitative and content diversity. Note that this figure is based on the most important
newspapers only. The mean of the distribution was taken to differentiate between low and
high degree of diversity. Japan and the United Kingdom were assigned to a specific cate-
gory ("very low"). These two countries were excluded from the calculation of the mean
because the 18 Japanese and British newspapers count for more than half of the circulation
of the 153 cases considered and would have distorted the classification of the other coun-
tries.
The cells of the main diagonal in Figure 5 represent the prevailing assumptions about the
relationship of quantitative and content diversity. It is supported by nine out of 17 coun-
tries. High concentration and low balance (see upper left cell), which can be regarded as
the worst case, is found in two countries (United Kingdom and Italy). Seven countries re-
veal the ideal situation with both high quantitative and high content diversity (see lower
right cell). The other two cells represent the counter-arguments. Five countries show that a
high degree of quantitative diversity may guarantee citizens' opportunity to choose be-
tween different sources of information, but does not necessarily provide access to alterna-
tive political viewpoints. All Nordic countries, except Denmark, and Ireland fall into this
category. On the other hand, the press systems of three countries are highly balanced in
spite of high concentration. In sum, the distribution of countries does not show a clear pat-
tern of relationship. It can be assumed that both dimensions of diversity vary independently
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from each other. Variations of content diversity may be caused by specific aspects of the
political culture, e.g., the cultural hegemony of an ideological bloc, historical associations
between the press and political parties, or the journalistic culture, rather than the economic
structure of the media industry.
Figure 5: Typology of press systems: Quantitative diversity (density) and content
diversity (balance) (circulation of the most important newspapers, 1990)
Content diversitya) Quantitative diversityb)
Very low Low High
Low UK ITA FIN
ICE
IRE
NOR
SWE
High JAP GER A
USA BEL
DEN
GRE
LUX
NET
SPA
n.a.: AUS, CAN, FRA, NEW, SWI, POR, TUR.
a) Overall balance; differentiation between low/high according to mean of deviance (0.31).
b) Density; differentiation between low/high according to mean of circulation without JAP and U.K.
(265.525; low density = high quantitative diversity.
6 Structures of diversity in broadcasting systems
Achieving diversity in broadcasting systems is much more problematic than is the case in
press systems. This is mainly a consequence of the particular technological and economical
features of broadcasting. For most of its existence, television was faced with a tight scar-
city of transmission capacity. In contrast to paper as the physical transmission facility of
the press, the availability of frequencies was considerably limited. In addition, the eco-
nomic constraints of broadcasting are a serious impediment of diversity. The production of
television programs is characterized by high costs which are entirely independent from the
number of consumers. Thus, the entry barrier for new actors is extremely high, and only a
few actors can survive on a national market. For these reasons, many media economists
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regard broadcasting as a "natural monopoly" (Owen/Wildman 1992; Garnham/Locksley
1991; Seufert 1994)
To safeguard a minimum of quantitative diversity, broadcasting has been subjected to
extensive regulation. The main instrument is the allocation of transmission facilities by a
license system by which concentration processes and the qualification of suppliers can be
controlled. Besides technological and economical rationales for regulation, political rea-
sons play an important role as well (Hoffmann-Riem 1996; Humphreys 1996). More than
the press, policy makers regard broadcasting as a powerful instrument in the political proc-
ess. Therefore, broadcasting has been submitted to several content-related regulations, in
particular to carry through internal diversity.
6.1 Formal regulation of goal orientation
In contrast to the press, broadcasting can be assigned either to civil or administrative law.
Especially in Europe public-service orientation and regulation by administrative law has
been the initial conception of broadcasting. The same holds for Japan that adopted the
BBC model after World War II. On the other hand, the US broadcasting system represents
the market-oriented model which is dominated by actors primarily pursuing commercial
interests.
Broadcasting in public-service systems is supposed to act primarily in favor of the com-
mon welfare. The main objective of public broadcasting is to promote societal integration
by serving as a public forum where different interests can be articulated. Coverage of the
entire country, representing minority interests, providing comprehensive information, and
supporting the national culture are further tasks imposed on public broadcasting (Blumler
1992; Katz 1989; Scharf 1990). Since public tasks are usually regarded as incompatible
with commercial goals, public stations are taken out of economic competition. Thus, ad-
ministrative law is usually the legal framework of public broadcasting, although it is not
the only possible arrangement. For example, Swedish public broadcasting is organized as a
joint-stock company, the shares of which are held by interest groups, publishing houses,
and commercial enterprises. In principal, the crucial criterion for classifying broadcasting
stations as "public" is the non-profit construction of the organization and the commitment
to the public interest (Sepstrup 1989).
In commercial systems broadcasters act as economic entrepreneurs pursuing the main
goal of profit-making. In order to maximize audiences, private broadcasting adapts to the
needs of the "median viewer" (Noam 1991:45ff.). However, even under civil law broad-
casting is obliged to some extent to observe public service standards. In contrast to the
press, the observation of standards is not left to self-control by the private broadcasters.
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Instead, supervisory bodies, which are accountable to parliament or government, exert
control to assure quantitative diversity as well as diversity in programming and political
content. Due to the increasing prevalence of deregulative policies, numerous countries
have minimized, in some cases even eliminated public service-oriented obligations. The
remaining constraints then refer to incenses, economic structure (concentration, foreign
ownership), advertising regulations and basic moral standards.
6.2 Structural diversification
Since quantitative diversity, i.e., the maximization of the number of actors, is structurally
limited in broadcasting systems, many countries aim to extend diversity by "structural di-
versification" (Hoffmann-Riem 1996:285). This can be achieved in two ways, namely by
establishing the coexistence of public and commercial goal orientation, and by imple-
menting commercial elements in the public sector. Both alternatives will be discussed in
the following sections.
6.2.1 Dualization and quantitative diversity
From the early 1980s onwards, more and more originally pure public broadcasting systems
lost their monopolistic position. The structural change towards dual systems was driven by
technological innovations like cable and satellite as well as the broadening of the terrestrial
spectrum by which the scarcity of transmission capacities could be overcome to a large
extent. In most cases dualization took place by new actors entering the system, whereas the
transformation of public into commercial stations, like in France, was the exception.
In addition, dualization opened up competition in broadcasting systems which had
hardly existed before. The optimistic assumption is that the confrontation of alternative
logics of broadcasting results in a dynamic where each segment is forced to strengthen its
advantages and to minimize its failures. Thus, public and commercial arrangements are
regarded as complementary structural elements each compensating for their respective
deficits. The main problem of public service broadcasting stems from the high degree of
supervision which makes it specifically vulnerable to political interference, be it by the
government like in France, or political parties like in Germany and Italy. In these coun-
tries, political actors dominate decision-making in the supervisory boards of broadcasting
organizations which frequently leads to instrumentalization, or at least to a higher inclina-
tion of television to serve the communicative interests of those in power. In addition, the
lack of market mechanisms often results in bureaucratic inflexibility and inefficiency. In
contrast, commercial broadcasting is vulnerable to economic interests that drive its pro-
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gramming towards mainstream taste and the marginalization of political information. Since
entertainment attracts the largest audiences, commercial television usually devotes only a
minimum of time to news and background information; at the same time, tries to avoid
controversial issues. Therefore, commercial broadcasting might be the adequate arrange-
ment to broaden quantitative diversity, but can be assumed as being less efficient with re-
spect to content diversity which is central to public debate and political opinion-building.
However, critics of deregulation doubt whether competition will prove to be the be-
nevolent invisible hand stimulating broadcasters to improve their performance to the end
that public television becomes more efficient and audience-oriented, and commercial tele-
vision increasing the quality of political information. On the contrary, competition in a
dual system may even deteriorate quality as public television in particular is compelled to
convergent programming and the adaptation to the entertainment preferences of the "me-
dian viewer" (Schatz 1994; Pfetsch 1996).
Table 4 shows the structural change of broadcasting systems that has taken place be-
tween 1980 and 1990 when the technological and formal preconditions for commercial
broadcasting have been broadened. The number of countries with dual broadcasting sys-
tems at national level has doubled during the decade under observation. The most notable
gain in quantitative diversity has occurred in the commercial segment. The number of na-
tional commercial stations increased from 10 to 24. But stations operating under the logic
of public-service orientation are still the majority. While the commercial segment is char-
acterized by dynamic growth, the public segment seems to be saturated with two stations
being the median number of actors. The exceptions with more than two stations are typi-
cally countries with a high degree of cultural segmentation, like Belgium, the Netherlands
and Switzerland. The three cases where the number of public stations has increased are
systems which consisted of only one station before. France is the only country that has
reduced the number of public stations.
Table 4: Number of broadcasting stations (1980, 1990; national level, terrestrial
distribution)
Country 1980 1990
Public Commercial Public Commercial
A 2 0 2 0
AUSa) 1 3 1 3
BELb) 4 0 4 2
CAN 2 1 2 1
DEN 1 0 2 0
FIN 1 1 2 1
FRA 3 0 2 3
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Table 4: (cont'd)
Country 1980 1990
Public Commercial Public Commercial
GER 3 0 3 2
GREc) 2 0 2 0
ICEd) 1 0 1 0
IREe) 2 0 2 0
ITA 3 0 3 3
JAPf) 2 0 2 0
LUX 0 1 0 1
NETg) 9 0 9 0
NEW 2 0 2 1
NOR 1 0 1 0
POR 2 0 2 0
SPA 2 0 2 2
SWEh) 2 0 2 0
SWI 3 0 3 0
TUR 1 0 2 0
UK 2 1 2 2
USA 1 3 1 3
å 52 10 54 24
a) The second public channel, SBS (Special Broadcasting Service) covers only the main urban areas.
b) Due to the cultural segmentation, none of the channels is distributed country-wide. Each of the two
linguistic groups (Dutch-speaking Flemish, French-speaking Walloons) is served by two public and
one commercial station.
c) Commercial broadcasting is only allowed at subnational level. However, two stations have expanded
to nearly nationwide coverage.
d) In 1990, there existed two private stations which were only available by pay-TV.
e) The commercial station, TV3, which started in 1990, is not counted here because it ceased already in
1991.
f) Commercial broadcasting is only allowed at subnational level. Due to network-building of the com-
mercial stations, Japan meanwhile has a de facto dual system.
g) The nine public stations are broadcasting on two (1980) and three (1990) channels. The private sta-
tions RTL4 which is producing in Dutch is being transmitted from outside the country.
h) The commercial station TV3 which is producing in Swedish is being transmitted from outside the
country.
The first steps towards dualization often took place at subnational level and by exploiting
new transmission technologies like cable. Table 5 gives an overview over these aspects of
quantitative diversity, although it does not fall into our general approach which focuses at
national level and on terrestrial transmission. Note that due to incomplete data and high
fluctuation on the subnational and cable market it is impossible to assess how many citi-
zens actually benefit from this form of diversification. Especially Italy and the USA reveal
an abundance of private stations at subnational level. But also the public segment has ex-
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panded quantitative diversity by regional and local stations. Cable facilities are utilized by
public and commercial actors alike, although a good deal of the capacities provided by
cable is used to transmit programs which are produced outside the country.
Table 5: Diversification of broadcasting systems by subnational and cable stations
(1990)
Country Regional and local
channels
Cable channels Cable
Public Commercial Publica) Commercial Households
(%)
A - - + - 25.0
AUS + ++ - - -
BEL - - + - 88.9
CAN ++ + n.a. n.a. 78.8
DEN ++ - - - 59.0
FIN - - - + 42.3
FRA - - + + 1.5
GER - ++ + + 24.8
GRE - + - - -
ICE - - - - -
IRE - - - - 48.9
ITA - +++ - - 0.4
JAP - ++ - - 18.0
LUX - - - - 63.3
NET - - - - 79.5
NEW n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -
NOR ++ - - - 33.3
POR - - - - -
SPA - + - - 3.0
SWE - - - + 29.4
SWI - + + + 69.1
TUR + - - - -
UK + - - ++ 1.4
USA +++ +++ - ++ 55.1
a) Most of the public cable channels are coproductions with other countries.
-: None.
+: < 10 stations.
++: 10 - 100 stations.
+++: < 100 stations.
Source: OECD 1993; Noam 1991; Hans-Bredow-Institut 1992.
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6.2.2 Modes of financing and the strength of public-service orientation
To modify the conditions of financing is the main instrument to achieve structural diversi-
fication within public service systems. As Blumler/Nossiter (1991:5) point out financing is
a key feature of broadcasting because it "correlate(s) with different broadcasting purposes."
Three basic forms of revenue sources exist which can be related to a continuum between
political accountability on the one hand and market orientation on the other hand:
State subsidies closely link broadcasting to the interests of the government. Broadcasting
systems that rely on subsidies are highly vulnerable to political interference as the amount
of available resources is directly dependent on political decisions. However, establishing a
subsidy system is not only driven by the motive of instrumentalizing the media. Especially
in less wealthy countries, where the income of the population is relatively low, the state
often takes the responsibility for public communication.
License fees are the most common financial resource in public-service systems. They are
paid by viewers for the availability of programs, thus creating "a mutual sense of responsi-
bility between broadcaster and audience members" (Head 1985:213). License fees are in-
tended to keep broadcasting independent from both state and market influences, thus ena-
bling broadcasters to produce comprehensive information which covers minority stand-
points as well as critical commentary (Blumler/Brynin/Nossiter 1986). However, since it is
usually the parliaments that decide on the fees, they can easily be used to exert political
pressure. In addition, it is criticized that there is no direct relationship between output and
consumer demand, frequently resulting in paternalistic and elitist programming policy
(Garnham/Locksley 1991).
Advertising revenues implement market mechanisms into the process of public commu-
nication. The main objectives of commercial financing is to increase the independence of
broadcasters from political pressure and to make programming more responsive to viewers'
demands. However, as the underlying logic of advertising revenues is to sell the attention
of as many viewers as possible to the advertiser the relationship between broadcaster and
viewers is an indirect one at best.9
The combination of modes of financing diversifies their respective incentives and risks.
In order to give public broadcasting more autonomy and to stimulate economic competi-
tion, state subsidies or license fees are supplemented or even replaced by advertising reve-
nues. The more public stations are financed by advertising the more their activity is as-
sumed to be shaped by the commercial goal orientation. Although they are not allowed to
make profits, they participate in the market and, thus, are inclined to produce mass-
attracting programs to maximize advertising incomes. After dualization the conditions of
                                                       
9 A direct relationship between consumer and broadcaster only exists with pay-TV which therefore is
often preferred by proponents of pure market structures in broadcasting (see Brittan 1991)
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public broadcasting systems that rely on mixed revenues have changed fundamentally.
Public stations have now been drawn into fierce competition with commercial stations for
advertisements. Since the advertising market has not grown correspondingly and public
stations still have to observe various restrictions, they have lost a considerable amount of
their revenues.
In Figure 6 broadcasting systems are classified according to the strength of their public-
service segment. One dimension shows the extent to which public stations are financed by
public revenues, i.e., state subsidies and/or license fees.10 The remaining portion of 100%
is commercial revenues. The second dimension specifies the relative size of the public-
service segment. For this purpose the mere number of actors is not a sufficient indicator
because the amount of their audiences varies. Analog to the circulation of newspapers, net
coverage is taken as a measure of the size of public broadcasting instead. The remaining
portion of 100% is the net coverage of commercial stations.
Figure 6: Strength of public-service orientation in broadcasting systems (1990;
national level)
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10 In Greece, public broadcasting is partly financed by a compulsory tax on electricity.
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The four quarters of the figure represent typical constellations of broadcasting systems
according to the prevalence of public-service orientation: The upper right quarter com-
prises systems which are unequivocally dominated by the public-service orientation as
most, if not all television coverage is provided by public stations which in addition are
mainly, if not completely financed by public revenues. In 1990, most of the OECD coun-
tries (13) fall into this category. Broadcasting systems in the lower left quarter are charac-
terized by the adverse structure, namely the dominance of commercial goal orientation.
Only two countries are located in this part of the figure. In the USA, public television is
confined to a very small audience and draws its financial resources mainly from other than
public funding, mostly from donations by commercial companies. Luxembourg does not
have a public broadcasting at all. The two other parts of the figure represent ambiguous
structures. The upper left quarter contains three broadcasting systems with an extensive
public-service segment which is only poorly supported by public funding. On the other
hand, the public service segments of the three countries located in the lower right quarter,
though constricted to less than half of the national coverage, are extensively financed by
public revenues.
The cases are not evenly distributed across the two-dimensional space. Rather, 16 of the
22 countries considered are located at the borderline of the figure, indicating that structural
diversification has been confined to one dimension only, i.e., either dualization or a mixed
mode of financing. In eight of these cases national television is exclusively provided by
public-service stations, whereas public revenues are to varying degrees supplemented by
advertising. Three countries have established a dual structure with the coexistence of pub-
lic and commercial stations, but exclude public broadcasting from competition by full non-
commercial funding. With regard to this combination the United Kingdom is the only case
which perfectly balances both logics. The strict separation between the two segments has
obviously contributed to their viability and stability. The Spanish broadcasting system is
unique in that its public segment is completely financed by advertising. Since it is also ex-
posed to competition with commercial stations, it can be hypothesized that in the long run
it will largely lose its public-service character. Only four countries reveal homogeneous
structures on both dimensions with Japan, Norway and Sweden representing pure public-
service systems and Luxembourg as a pure commercial system occupying the other ex-
treme point.
In sum, the classification shows that in 1990 public-service orientation was still the
dominant logic of broadcasting. Due to the growing pressure caused by economic compe-
tition and globalization, public broadcasting has moved towards the commercial logic of
operation during the last years. At the same time, even the legitimacy of the license fee has
36
been questioned which may result in a new conception of the political and cultural role of
public broadcasting and eventually its marginalization (Kleinsteuber/Wiesner/Wilke 1991).
6.3 Diversity of opinions
There is almost no variation with regard to different forms of content diversity in broad-
casting systems. For the most part television stations are committed to internal diversity
either by formal regulation or by an economic strategy.
The forum function of public-service broadcasting naturally requires internal diversity.
This holds all the more as the limited number of actors makes balanced complementarity of
biases rather unlikely. There are only two exceptions where external diversity has been
established in public broadcasting systems. In the Netherlands, political interests are or-
ganized according to the principle of "pillarization," i.e., societal life and intermediary in-
stitutions are vertically segmented, especially along religious denomination and social
class. Pillarization is applied to the organization of broadcasting as well. Fixed time appor-
tionments are allocated to each of the main groups to broadcast their own programs. There
exist nine different broadcasting organizations which transmit their programs on three
channels. Air time is allocated according to the groups' support in the population.11 An-
other externally diverse system is Italy where on the basis of an informal agreement each
of the main political parties, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists,
is granted privileged access to one of the three channels of RAI.12 Internal diversity can
also be regarded as being restricted where the government intervenes into broadcasting
programming. This applies to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In these countries gov-
ernment frequently interferes in political reporting by giving direct instructions or banning
particular news items and opinions.
In some countries commercial broadcasting is formally bound to observe internal diver-
sity as well. In Germany, for example, commercial television is only conceded external
diversity or special interest programs if there exist at least three nationwide general private
programs. In the USA, the so-called Fairness Doctrine expected US broadcasting to ob-
serve internal diversity by giving balanced coverage to all sides of a conflict and providing
                                                       
11 The broadcasting organizations are allied with religious groups (Evangelicals, Catholics, Protes-
tants) as well as political ideologies (Liberals, Social Democrats). Three are neutral. Support of one
of the broadcasting organizations is indicated by subscription of their program magazines
(Brants/McQuail 1992).
12 After 1990, the breakdown of the Italian party system inevitably affected the ideological structure of
broadcasting.
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equal time to political candidates.13 The crucial diversity problem, however, that arises
with commercial broadcasting is mainly the diversity of programming rather than the di-
versity of political opinions. Several program analyses which compare the performance of
commercial and public stations clearly show considerably lower amounts of political in-
formation in commercial station output, thus making political information less available to
viewers (Sonnenberg 1990 for EU countries; Krüger 1992 for Germany).
6.4 Typology of broadcasting systems: Formal diversity and diversity of actors
Several efforts have been undertaken to formulate typologies of broadcasting systems. Al-
though these typologies have contributed to specify basic structural characteristics of
broadcasting systems, they often are unsatisfactory in that they lack systematic categoriza-
tion or empirical applicability.
The best-known typology is that of Siebert/Peterson/Schramm (1969). The authors dis-
tinguish between "four rationales of the media," defined as authoritarian, libertarian, so-
cial-responsibility and totalitarian models. This approach is widely used in comparative
media studies, but has also been criticized for several reasons (Lowenstein/Merrill
1990:163ff.; Nimmo/Mansfield 1982). The main objection is that the definition of the four
types confound normative expectations and empirical manifestations. It mainly draws upon
philosophical derivatives about the functions of the media in society, but also argues with
institutional arrangements like ownership. In addition, the concepts are only of limited
utility for empirical comparisons. Since the types are constructed on the basis of invariable
categories rather than on dimensions, they do not capture the broad variation that exists
within each of the types. As a consequence, authors referring to Siebert/Peterson/Schramm
simply group media systems into geo-political areas like Western World, Third World and
Communist World (Martin/Chaudhary 1983).
Wiio (1983) offers three highly abstract four-fold typologies. This approach goes far be-
yond the Siebert/Peterson/Schramm typology as it systematically relates basic structures of
media systems to each other. The categories of the typologies are receiver system and mes-
sage system, ownership and control, and the right to receive and the right to send, which
are then classified as "open/close," "public/private" and "individual/societal." However, the
resulting types do not offer significant gains. Two of the typologies result in virtually
identical types as with Siebert/Peterson/Schramm. Another one merely distinguishes be-
tween press and television on the one hand, and broad country groups (western, commu-
                                                       
13 The Fairness Doctrine has been abrogated in 1987, mainly because of formal reasons concerning its
legal status (Hoffmann-Riehm 1996:246ff.). Undoubtedly, the then dominant political philosophy of
deregulation has contributed to this decision.
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nist, developing countries) on the other hand. In addition, it remains dubious whether and
how Wiio's dimensions can be applied empirically.
Brants/Siune's (1992:104) typology of broadcasting systems aims directly at empirical
classification, though it is less well developed theoretically. The authors distinguish be-
tween "pure public," "mixed revenue," "dual system," and "pure commercial." These cate-
gories which are constructed as one-dimensional variations compound in fact two different
dimensions, namely formal structure and the mode of financing. Thus, dual systems, whose
public segments are entirely financed by public revenues, and those, which are not, cannot
be differentiated. As we have pointed out earlier (see section 6.2.2), these different struc-
tural conditions are of crucial importance to the viability of public broadcasting.
The following typology of broadcasting systems combines two dimensions of diversity,
that is formal and quantitative diversity. The dimension of formal diversity classifies the
goal orientation as it is constituted by institutional arrangements. The categories refer to
the question of whether or not the citizens can choose between different goal orientations,
i.e., public and commercial interests. A monopolistic structure comprises only one of the
goal orientations, whereas a competitive structure consists of both, thereby facilitating
choice. The dimension of quantitative diversity relates to the question of whether or not
citizens can choose between different actors within one of the segments of the broadcasting
system. A monopolistic structure, where only one actor exists, provides no opportunity for
choice, while a competitive structure comprising alternative actors does.
Figure 7: Typology of broadcasting systems
Formal diversitya) Quantitative diversityb)
Monopolistic Competitive
in public/in commercial
segment
Monopolistic
• public service orientation Public hegemony Public multitude
• commercial orientation Commercial hegemony Commercial multitude
Competitive Limited multiplicity with he-
gemony within segment(s)
Open multiplicity
a) Number of formal goal orientations; monopolistic = one, competitive = more than one.
b) Number of actors (television stations); monopolistic = one, competitive = more than one.
Figure 7 shows the four-fold table resulting from the formal and the quantitative dimen-
sion of diversity. Three of the cells define variations of diversity which differ according to
the extent of possible choices: "Multitude" of choice is provided by a system consisting of
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only one goal orientation, but competing actors. The type of "limited multiplicity" defines
systems which consist of both goal orientations, but do not provide diversity of actors
within segments. "Open multiplicity" offers most opportunities of choice as it consists of
both goal orientations and within each of which more than one actor. In contrast, the upper
left cell defines a non-choice structure where "hegemony" exists both in the formal and in
the quantitative dimension of diversity.
Figure 7.1: Classification of broadcasting systems: Formal and quantitative diversity
(1990, national level)
Formal diversity Quantitative diversity
Monopolistic Competitive
in public/in commercial
segment
Monopolistic
• public service orientation ICE A
NOR DEN
GRE
IRE
JAP
NET
POR
SWE
SWI
TUR
• commercial orientation LUX -
Competitive AUS CAN BEL
USA NEW FRA
FIN GER
ITA
SPA
UK
Figure 7.1 classifies the broadcasting systems of the OECD countries according to this
typology. The classification includes stations that operate at national level and cover at
least three-quarters of the population (see Table 4). In 1990, almost all broadcasting sys-
tems (21 countries) offer at least a minimum of choice. About half of them (10) confine
competition to stations operating under the logic of public-service goal orientation. There-
fore, their diversity structure can be classified as "public multitude." Another 11 countries
have established dual systems; six of them are classified as the "open multiplicity" type,
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indicating a diversity structure with optimal choice opportunities, whereas in five dual
systems diversity is limited to one of the two segments as no competition exists between
similar actors. The remaining three countries where no choice opportunities exist are Ice-
land and Norway with the hegemony of a single public stations and Luxembourg with the
hegemony of a single commercial station.
Taking subnational diversity and cable television into account (see Table 5), we would
obtain different classifications in some cases. Norway has established a number of regional
public stations and would therefore move from "public monopoly" to the "public multi-
tude" type of diversity. In Iceland, two commercial programs are distributed as pay-TV
which are not considered in Figure 7.1 because this mode of distribution systematically
restricts the general availability of programs as well. Considering these two additional ac-
tors, diversity in Iceland's broadcasting system would be classified as "limited multiplic-
ity." Thanks to subnational diversification and/or cable technology, Japan, Sweden and
Switzerland are in fact dual systems and would fall under "open multiplicity." For the same
reasons, Australia, Canada and the USA would move from "limited" to "open multiplicity."
However, in many cases the opportunities of diversification have merely been used to ex-
pand diversity within the existing formal structure. This applies to Austria, Denmark and
Turkey where the number of public stations has been increased. Considering the develop-
ments since 1990, broadening the "multitude" of choice turned out to be merely a transi-
tional stage in the evolution towards dualization in these countries.
A comparison with 1980 demonstrates the fundamental change that has taken place in
broadcasting systems. Figure 7.2 classifies OECD countries before technological innova-
tions and deregulatory policy facilitated diversification. In 1980, public service was clearly
the dominant formal arrangement of broadcasting. However, most public systems (14) had
at least an established quantitative diversity, thus falling into the type of "public multi-
tude," whereas four systems were restricted to a monopolistic structure. Five countries had
already established dual systems, although none of them achieved "open multiplicity."
These cases of early dualization are quite remarkable because multiplicity has been ac-
complished before it was supported by technological developments. Finland and the United
Kingdom, after starting with public broadcasting, established a commercial segment al-
ready in the formative years of television. In these countries, particular institutional ar-
rangement and a high degree of regulation in both segments have protected especially the
viability of the public segment up to now. In contrast, Canada and Australia established
dual systems from the beginning. While they basically favored broadcasting as economic
enterprise, they added a public sector in order to substitute for anticipated shortcomings of
commercial television. In the United States which in principal prefers commercial broad-
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casting, the delayed introduction of a public segment as well as the lack of supportive poli-
cies may be seen as a reason for its marginality.
Figure 7.2: Classification of broadcasting systems: Formal and quantitative diversity
(1980, national level)
Formal diversity Quantitative diversity
Monopolistic Competitive
in public/in commercial
segment
Monopolistic
• public service orientation DEN A
ICE BEL
NOR FRA
TUR GER
GRE
ICE
ITA
JAP
NET
NEW
POR
SPA
SWE
SWI
• commercial orientation LUX -
Competitive AUS CAN -
FIN FIN
USA UK
7 Diversity of media systems: Towards a typology
Press and broadcasting are usually discussed separately, thus ignoring that media systems
are built up by both subsystems which interact with each other. Generalized statements on
the media that are based on findings on the performance and effects of television fall short
as long as they do not take the particular performance and effects of the press into account,
and vice versa. However, the different constraints under which press and broadcasting are
operating make it immensely difficult to integrate both parts of the media systems both
theoretically and empirically.
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In the following we suggest tentative typologies of media systems that encompass both
subsystems. For this purpose we will draw upon the dimension of quantitative diversity
and the dimension of content diversity. Since there is no variation with regard to formal
diversity in press systems, it does not make sense to take this dimension into account. Re-
lating press and broadcasting provides us with a general picture of whether a particular
diversity structure dominates the entire media system or whether limitations of diversity
are confined to only one of the segments.
The combination of measures of diversity in press and broadcasting systems requires a
fairly abstract approach. Thus, the classification distinguishes between low and high levels
of diversity. Figure 8.1 classifies media systems according to the dimension of quantitative
diversity.
Figure 8.1: Classification of media systems: Quantitative diversity (1990)
Press systema) Broadcasting systemb)
Low High
Low A AUS
IRE BEL
JAP CAN
NET FRA
POR GER
ITA
SPA
UK
USA
High DEN FIN
ICE GRE
LUX NEW
NOR
SWE
SWI
TUR
a) Number of formal goal orientations; monopolistic = one, competitive = more than one.
b) Number of actors (television stations); monopolistic = one, competitive = more than one.
The classification shows the extent to which alternative information sources exist in press
and broadcasting systems. The degree of quantitative diversity in press systems is indicated
by the relative amount of newspapers using the mean of the distribution to distinguish be-
tween low and high levels. Broadcasting systems are classified according to whether or not
there exist more than one actor operating under more than one formal goal orientation. A
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low-choice structure is represented by the two types of hegemony and multitude, whereas
multiplicity, both limited and open, is taken as a high degree of choice.
The media systems of eight countries are characterized by the same structure in both
subsystems with five countries (Austria, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal) revealing
severely restricted diversity, whereas only three countries (Finland, Greece, New Zealand)
achieve an optimal structure combining a high degree of quantitative diversity in both
press and broadcasting. However, the diversity structure of most media systems (16) is
ambiguous. In most Nordic countries, a low degree of quantitative diversity in broadcast-
ing coincides with high diversity in the press system. In contrast, especially the Anglo-
Saxon and the southern European countries provide choice in broadcasting systems mainly,
while press diversity is limited.
In Figure 8.2 media systems are classified according to content diversity. For this pur-
pose we draw upon the dimension of internal diversity because this structure of political
information is a better guarantee of the availability of all relevant political opinions than
external diversity. For press systems we specify whether the circulation of the ten most
important newspapers committed to internal diversity falls below or above the overall
mean of neutral circulation. Broadcasting systems that are dominated by external diversity
and/or are subjected to direct government interference are classified as being of low con-
tent diversity.
Figure 8.2: Classification of media systems: Internal diversity (1990)
Press systema) Broadcasting systemb)
Low High
Low GRE Den
IRE ICE
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USA
n.a.: AUS, CAN, FRA, NEW, SWI, POR, TUR.
a) Number of formal goal orientations; monopolistic = one, competitive = more than one.
b) Number of actors (television stations); monopolistic = one, competitive = more than one.
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Seven of the 17 countries for which we have complete information reveal the optimal
structure of a high degree of internal diversity in both subsystems. On the other hand, four
countries represent the worst case of the entire media system being characterized by a low
degree of internal diversity. The performance of these media systems in providing a broad
range of opinions as basis for the citizens' "enlightened" decision-making can be assumed
to be limited. In five media systems a low degree of internal diversity in the press system is
compensated by the broadcasting system, while the press system in the Netherlands coun-
terbalances the segmentation of the broadcasting system.
A comparison of Figures 8.1. and 8.2 shows that the structure of quantitative diversity
does not necessarily parallel the structure of content diversity. In Japan and Austria, we
find a pattern of high content diversity in both subsystems together with low quantitative
diversity. If we assume the availability of alternative viewpoints as of higher importance to
rational opinion-building than the number of alternative information sources, this structure
may be regarded as sufficient, albeit not optimal. From this perspective the situation in
Greece where a large number of actors does not provide content diversity appears to be
less supportive for the democratic process. Analog structures of quantitative and content
diversity exist only in two countries with Ireland as the worst case providing limited diver-
sity in both subsystems, and Finland revealing an optimal diversity structure in both press
and broadcasting. Finally, the media system of the United Kingdom has to be mentioned.
In this country diversity is mainly guaranteed by broadcasting while the press system is
characterized by deficits on both diversity dimensions.
8 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was primarily a systematic one. It aimed at identifying central
structural characteristics of media systems and at operationalizing these concepts in a way
that can be applied to empirical comparative analyses. We have argued that diversity be a
central characteristic of democratic public communication because it enables citizens to
deliberate contesting political alternatives and make intelligent choices. On the basis of this
normative perspective, we differentiated two general dimensions of diversity the empirical
variations of which are assumed to affect the political communication process.
In a first step we distinguished between formal and informal types of diversity structure.
The formal structure of the mass media refers to the variety of institutional arrangements
imposed by legal regulation which constrain the possible behavior of newspapers or televi-
sion. The informal structure refers to the empirical interaction pattern between the consti-
tutive elements of mass communication. These elements make up the second dimension of
diversity structure. It is distinguished between quantitative aspects of diversity, referring to
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the variety of actors, and content diversity, referring to the plurality of opinions which are
represented in a system. Content diversity was further differentiated into internal diversity
that is based on the principle of neutrality, and external diversity resulting from media
outlets each of which supporting different political ideologies. Since press and broadcast-
ing perform under very different economic and technological constraints, specific opera-
tionalizations and typologies of the general concepts of diversity have to be developed.
As there exists only little formal regulation of the press, the analysis focussed on the
empirical pattern of quantitative and content diversity. With respect to quantitative diver-
sity in press systems we draw upon the relative amount of newspapers and the density or
concentration. The results show considerable differences between OECD countries with
extreme cases of concentration on the one hand (Japan, France, U.K.) and, on the other
hand, high variety of actors especially in small countries. The comparison over time
(1970/1990) reveals a uniform trend in all countries with a more or less enormous decrease
in quantitative diversity in spite of growing circulation rates.
To measure content diversity of press systems the ten major newspapers of each country
were classified according to their editorial program. Neutral or independent newspapers
were classified, following the principle of internal diversity. This structure of diversity
guarantees best comprehensive information about the political debate, although the
evaluation of contesting standpoints is largely left to the individual reader. In externally
diverse systems the representation of the whole range of opinions is expected to emerge on
the system level as the aggregation of single actors. At the same time, the information re-
ceived by the individual reader might be restricted. Although internal diversity is usually
presumed to be the preferable pattern of media diversity, newspapers pursuing a coherent
ideological program serve an important orientation function in the process of public opin-
ion formation as they provide readers with interpretive cues of how to organize the infor-
mation (Voltmer 1997). The empirical analysis shows that most press systems dominated
by external diversity constitute a sufficient balance between left and right outlets. There are
only few exceptions, such as Ireland whose press system is clearly distorted towards the
right, and the U.K., Italy and Greece which reveal a moderate lack of balance. Over a time
period of twenty years (1970/1990) internal diversity has become the prevalent structure in
Western press systems.
The suggested typology of press systems relates quantitative diversity and content diver-
sity. It distinguishes between the highly problematic type with restricted diversity on both
dimensions (Italy, U.K.), and the optimal constellation of both high quantitative and con-
tent diversity (seven countries). The two other categories are ambiguous types that estab-
lish diversity only on one of the dimensions. Since the comprehensive representation of
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opinions is the ultimate goal of diversity, the restriction of content diversity (three coun-
tries) is less tolerable than the restriction of quantitative diversity (five countries).
The structure of broadcasting systems is much more determined by formal regulation
than it is with press systems. The basic alternatives are assignment to administrative or
civil law which imply the prevalence of a particular goal orientation, namely public-service
orientation devoted to the public welfare on the one hand, and commercial orientation pri-
marily seeking economic success on the other hand. Since each of the formal settings is
assumed to entail specific shortcomings, a large number of countries have established
structural diversification by dualization, i.e., the coexistence of public and commercial
broadcasting segments, or the combination of regulative instruments, notably modes of
financing. As a consequence, quantitative diversity has considerably increased between
1980 and 1990 at national level. In addition, we specified the particular strength of public-
service orientation in broadcasting systems measuring the net coverage and the amount of
public subsidies. It turns out that only very few countries stick with unequivocal structural
arrangements, being either pure public-service systems (three countries) or pure commer-
cial systems (Luxembourg). All other countries have accomplished internal differentiation
by particular diversification. However, in the overwhelming number of countries public-
service orientation is the prevalent mode of broadcasting. In only four countries this orien-
tation plays a marginal role. The case of the British broadcasting system has to be men-
tioned as it represents a perfect balance of both goal orientations.
The suggested typology of broadcasting systems relates formal and quantitative diver-
sity. The guiding question is whether alternative goal orientations and/or alternative actors
exist from which citizens can choose to satisfy their information needs. The combination of
the two dimensions of diversity results in four types, namely public/commercial hegem-
ony, public/commercial multitude, limited multiplicity and open multiplicity, which can be
regarded as a continuum of the degree of diversity. In 1990, 13 countries were classified in
the two lower categories, with three broadcasting systems still remaining monopolistic.
Eleven countries fall into the higher categories, six of which having achieved open multi-
plicity.
Usually press and broadcasting are studied separately although conclusions drawn from
analysis of one of them frequently refer to "the media." We finally developed two typolo-
gies of media systems as a whole, relating the dimensions of quantitative diversity and
content diversity of press and broadcasting systems. The classification according to quan-
titative diversity shows a complementary structure in most of the media systems: the re-
striction of diversity in one of the subsystems is counterbalanced by a high amount of out-
lets in the other subsystem. With respect to content diversity, we find four media systems
that do not offer a sufficient range of political viewpoints in any of the subsystems. In all
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other media systems we find either an optimal structure or a situation where at least one of
the subsystems meets the expectations of diversity.
In our analysis we could not address the question of how structural differences of the
media system affect the actual output of the media and eventually the attitudes and behav-
ior of individuals. Several authors have hypothesized about the consequences of the macro-
structural context of public communication on political behavior. Wattenberg (1986) as-
sumes neutrality of media information to be the main reason for the increasing volatility of
voters. He argues that neutral reporting that confronts voters with opposing viewpoints
without providing consistent interpretations contributes to the erosion of belief systems.
However, Wattenberg's study is exclusively based on American data. Therefore, we do not
know about the precise causal relationship and whether the findings can be generalized
across countries. Our classification of media systems according to the structure of content
diversity enables us to choose contrasting contexts of information diversity deliberately.
With this kind of theoretically guided selection of countries at hand Wattenberg's hypothe-
sis could be tested in a more systematic way.
With respect to broadcasting systems, our findings show considerable differences in the
extent to which television stations are committed to public or commercial goals. An inter-
esting question of future research would be how political actors -  parties, interest groups,
or governments -  try to get access to the citizens in different contexts of public communi-
cation. It can be assumed that political actors tend to institutionalize professional public
relations as a permanent task of their organizations when they are confronted with a broad-
casting system dominated by commercial goal orientation, whereas they can rely on easier
access chances in a public-service context.
In general, our analysis of the structure of diversity in press and broadcasting systems
has identified information environments which offer different opportunities of public de-
liberation and individual opinion formation. Precise knowledge of the specific structural
arrangements with regard to media diversity is an indispensable basis for future compara-
tive research as it allows for purposeful selection of cases to investigate the performance
and consequences of mass communication.
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